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Decision Dynamics in Groups with Interacting Members∗
Reginald J Caginalp† and Brent Doiron† ‡
Abstract. Group decisions involve the combination of evidence accumulation by individual members and di-
rect member-to-member interactions. We consider a simplified framework of two deciders, each
undergoing a two alternative forced choice task, with the choices of early deciding members bias-
ing members who have yet to choose. We model decision dynamics as a drift-diffusion process and
present analysis of the associated Fokker-Planck equation for the group. We show that the probabil-
ity of coordinated group decisions (both members make the same decision) is maximized by setting
the decision threshold of one member to a lower value than its neighbor’s. This result is akin to a
speed-accuracy tradeoff, where the penalty of lowering the decision threshold is choice inaccuracy
while the benefit is that earlier decisions have a higher probability of influencing the other member.
We numerically extend these results to large group decisions, where it is shown that by choosing the
appropriate parameters, a small but vocal component of the population can have a large amount of
influence on the total system.
Key words. Decision theory, Diffusion processes, Group decision-making models, Decision aggregation
AMS subject classifications. 60H30, 91E99, 92B05
1. Introduction. There is a long history of study in how evidence is integrated and ul-
timately drives decisions [11, 21, 4]. An often used framework is the two-alternative forced
choice task (TAFC), where decisions are constrained to be between two alternatives with
evidence steadily accumulated over time. While the TAFC framework is admittedly oversim-
plified it has provided a wealth of data by which to compare and contrast various models
of decision processes [4]. Many models treat TAFC decision dynamics as a drift-diffusion
stochastic process [25, 16, 24, 4, 17], where the drift term models the steady accumulation of
evidence and the diffusion term models variability in decision making. Drift-diffusion models
capture observed decision behavior at both single neuron [12] and psychophysical levels [18],
and has been shown to perform optimal decision making with appropriate assumptions [4].
Decisions are not always made by individuals in isolation, yet by members in a group where
all individuals are actively engaged in the decision process [29, 8]. There are mixed reports
about the benefits (or lack of) of deciding within a group, with examples where group decisions
are more accurate [27] and others where a systematic group bias is detected [10]. Nevertheless,
group decision making theory has been applied to economics, political science, and animal
behavior [1, 3, 7, 2, 13, 8, 22]. Combining the drift-diffusion dynamics of a population of
deciders performing a TAFC task to form a group decision is a natural extension, and several
groups have made important advances in this area (see [14] for a review). However, these
modeling studies rarely consider interactions between deciders during evidence accumulation
(but see [23]).
In this paper we consider a group of deciders each engaged in a TAFC task with each
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member modeled as a drift-diffusion processes. When a member of the group makes a decision
it communicates its choice to all other members of the group, with the hope to influence those
who have yet to decide. In general, introducing coupling between drift-diffusion processes
creates significant challenges in any analysis. To make our model tractable we consider an
instantaneous interaction: when a certain member decides, it ‘kicks’ all the other members
towards the decision it made. Following the interaction, the decision makers continue their
drift-diffusion processes independent of one another. Therefore, other than at a finite set
of interaction times, the stochastic processes are independent of each other. This type of
interaction permits a calculation of the probabilities of group decisions through extensions of
the single decider framework.
We begin with the simple case of two deciders. One of the deciders is biased towards the
+ choice (without loss of generality). By varying the amount of evidence that is required for
this decider to make a decision (decision threshold), we aim to maximize the probability that
both deciders choose the + decision (++ decision). In the case where there is no interaction
between the deciders, the optimal solution for the + decider is to require a very large amount
of evidence to make a decision. In this way, the random noise from the diffusion term is
irrelevant and the + decider always makes the + decision. Thus, the probability of a joint
++ decision rests solely on the other decider (which the + decider has no influence over).
We contrast this to the case with decider interaction. We find that for large enough decider
coupling a finite decision threshold maximizes the probability of a ++ decision. A compromise
occurs between the + decider sometimes choosing the − decision in error, but the + decider
having the possibility of influence over the other decider. We conclude by showing that the
intuition gained for the two decider case carries over to a large N -decider population.
2. Results.
2.1. Stochastic dynamics in pairs of deciders. We begin by considering a system of two
deciders, each of which is trying to decide between a + choice and a – choice (Figure 1). The
group decision dynamics obey the following pair of Langevin equations [20]:
dX1 = µ1dt+
√
2DdW1 +G2qδ(t− t1),(1)
dX2 = µ2dt+
√
2DdW2 +G1qδ(t− t2).(2)
The processes X1(t) and X2(t) represent the amount of evidence collected by the decider
1 and 2 at time t, respectively. For a given decider i (i = 1, 2), when the evidence Xi(t)
reaches a value +θi it decides on the + choice, but if the evidence reaches −θi, it decides on
the − choice. We consider evidence accumulation to be stochastic and include the Brownian
processes W1(t) and W2(t) (W1(t) and W2(t) are statistically independent), with diffusion
coefficient D > 0. Finally, we set X1(0) = X2(0) = 0 so that neither decider is initially biased
towards the + or − decision.
The random decision time for decider i is denoted by ti and Gi = 1 if i chooses the +
choice, while Gi = −1 if i chooses the − choice. The interaction between the deciders is
modeled by the final terms in Eqs. (1) and (2). When decider i chooses the ± choice at time
ti, it provides an instantaneous evidence kick of intensity Giq at time ti to Xj (j 6= i). In other
words, upon a decision a decider will attempt to influence its neighbor to choose the same
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Figure 1: Modeling group decisions with drift-diffusion dynamics. A. Instantaneous kick:
A decider crosses through the − threshold, and immediately kicks its neighbor across the
same threshold. B. Kick and diffusion: A decider crosses through the + threshold and kicks
its neighbor up by an amount q = θ/2 after which the decider then diffuses across the +
threshold.
choice it did. We remark that the coupling term is only relevant if the neighbor decider has
yet to decide. Assuming decider i decides before decider j, then the interaction can separated
into two cases: either decider i kicks j across ±θj instantly (meaning ti = tj ; see Figure
1A), or it kicks decider j and it eventually drifts across one of the boundaries at a later time
(tj > ti; see Figure 1B). An alternative model of decision coupling would be for µj → µj +q at
time ti. This model would imply that a neighbor’s decision is a continual source of evidence
to the other decider, which must be accumulated over time to have influence. In this study
we confine ourselves to the former model where decisions are communicated in an instant.
We are interested in the group decision (G1, G2). One approach for obtaining the proba-
bilities of (G1, G2) is to estimate them from many Monte-Carlo realizations of Eqs. (1) and
(2). Another is to solve an associated Fokker-Planck equation to obtain analytic estimates for
G1 and G2. We follow both of these approaches and find that they agree very closely.
2.2. Calculating group decisions with interaction. The group decision dynamics within
our model is a two dimensional problem governed by the concentration c(x1, x2, t). With
proper normalization (see below) the concentration is the probability density at time t for the
evidences X1 and X2 over x1 ∈ (−θ1, θ1) and x2 ∈ (−θ2, θ2), respectively. Since X1 and X2
are independent before the first interaction at time ti, the evolution of the system decouples
for t < ti and we get that c(x1, x2, t) = c1(x1, t)c2(x2, t). The stochastic dynamics of either
Eqs. (1) and (2) obey the associated Fokker-Planck equation [20] for ci(x, t):
(3)
∂ci
∂t
= −µi∂ci
∂x
+D
∂2ci
∂x2
, i = 1, 2.
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A decision occurs when Xi reaches one the boundaries ±θi; this amounts to supplementing
Eq. (3) with the absorbing boundary conditions:
ci (θi, t) = ci (−θi, t) = 0,
for all t > 0. Furthermore, there is no evidence accumulation for t < 0 so that the concentration
at time t = 0 obeys:
ci (x, 0) = δ (x) .
In general, under these conditions the drift-diffusion equation admits the Fourier series
solution:
(4) ci (x, t) =
∞∑
m=1
e
µix
2D
2θi
(−1)m+1 e−k2m−1t sin (w2m−1 (x+ θi))
where
w2m−1 ≡ (2m− 1)pi
2θi
,
k2m−1 ≡ µ
2
i
4D
+Dw22m−1.
In what follows we wish to calculate the probability that both deciders cross the + thresh-
old (without loss of generality). This requires incorporating the interaction that happens at
the decision time of the first decider. The conditioned first passage time (FPT) density of
decider i is denoted f±i (t), and it describes the probability that the decider will make the ±
decision at time t. Note that
∫∞
0 f
±
i (t)dt is the total probability that the decider makes the ±
choice, and we have that
∫∞
0 [f
+
i (t) + f
−
i (t)]dt = 1 (i.e there is always a decision). The total
FPT density of decider i is then:
fi(t) ≡ f+i (t) + f−i (t).
The FPT densities can be computed from the flux of concentration passing the threshold at
time t:
f±i (t) = ∓ D
∂c
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=±θi
.
If we condition on decider i deciding before j (ti < tj) then the FPT density of decider i
escaping through the ±θ threshold at time ti is simply:
(5) f±i (ti|ti < tj) = f±i (ti)
∫ ∞
ti
fj(tj)dtj .
As expected the conditioned f±θi (ti|ti < tj) is an asymmetric, single mode function (Figure
2). Using the truncated Fourier series solution in Eq. (5) gives an excellent agreement for
f±i (ti|ti < tj) estimated from direct simulations of Eqs. (1) and (2) (Figure 2).
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
Fi
rs
t P
as
sa
ge
 T
im
e 
D
en
si
ty
 
theory
simulations
Time
Figure 2: Simulated and theoretical FPT densities for decider 1 making the + decision first.
We take D = 1, µ1 = −µ2 = 0.75, and θ1 = θ2 = 1. For the theoretical FPT density we
truncated the Fourier series solution for c(x, t) at mode m = 100.
Immediately before decider j is kicked at time ti, labelled t
→
i
1, the concentration cj(x, t
→
i )
of decider j is given by:
cj(x, t
→
i ) =
∞∑
m=1
e
µjx
2D
2θj
(−1)m+1 e−k2m−1ti sin (w2m−1 (x+ θj)) .
For decider j to escape at the ± threshold, there are two cases to consider: 1) j is kicked
across the ± threshold instantly (tj = ti; Figure 1A), or 2) j is kicked and then diffuses across
the ± threshold at a later time (tj > ti, Figure 1B). The conditional probability that j crosses
the ± gate can be thus decomposed as:
P (Gj = ±1|i crossing ± gate at time ti)
= P (j inst. crossing ± gate|i crossing ± gate at time ti)
+ P (j diff. across ± gate|i crossing ± gate at time ti).
If Xj is between the lower value L
+
j ≡ θj − q and the upper value U+j ≡ θj , then the
decider will be kicked instantaneously across the +θj gate (assuming decider i made the +
choice). Similarly, if the decider j is between L−j ≡ −θj and U−j ≡ −θj + q, then the decider
will be kicked instantaneously across the −θj gate (assuming decider i made the - choice).
The probability of instantaneous crossing conditioned on i crossing the ± gate at time ti is
then the probability that the evidence Xj will be in the range (L
±
j , U
±
j ). That is,
P (j inst. crossing ± gate|i crossing ± gate at time ti) =
∫ U±j
L±j
cj(x, t
→
i )dx∫ θj
−θj cj(x, t
→
i )dx
.
1To avoid cumbersome notation we denote the left (right) limit t→ ti as t→i (t←i ).
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We can make this expression simpler by defining the density ρ(x, t) as the normalized concen-
tration:
ρi(x, t) ≡ ci(x, t)∫ θi
−θi ci(x, t)dx
.
This means that
∫ θi
−θi ρi(x, t)dx = 1 for all t > 0. Then the above equation becomes
(6) P (j inst. crossing ± gate|i crossing ± gate at time ti) =
∫ U±j
L±j
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx.
We next must treat the case when decider j is kicked and then diffuses across the threshold
separately. At time ti decider j is kicked with magnitude q and we assume that Xj(t
→
i )± q ∈
(−θj , θj). Immediately after the kick the concentration cj(x, t+i ) of decider j is shifted by
magnitude q in the ±x direction:
cj(x, t
←
i ) = cj(x∓ q, t→i ).
For times t > ti we again have independent diffusion and the evidence accumulation of decider
j can be obtained from the one dimensional diffusion process (Eq. (3)), now with an initial
density of cj(x, t
←
i ) (as opposed to cj(x, 0) = δ(x)). However, in this case we are only interested
in the decision Gj and not the decision time tj .
For simple random walk dynamics it is well known that if decider j has evidence x the
probability that it will cross through the ± gate is denoted by ±j is given by [19, 26]:
+j (x) = exp
(
µj(θj − x)
2D
)
sinh[µj(x+ θj)/(2D)]
sinh[2µjθj/(2D)]
,
−j (x) = 1− +j (x).
If i escapes through the positive gate then decider j is not kicked across instantly if Xj
is between Λ+j ≡ −θj and Ω+j ≡ θj − q. Equivalently, if i escapes through the negative gate,
decider j is not kicked across instantly if it is between Λ−j ≡ −θj + q and Ω−j ≡ θj . From this
we have the probability that j is not kicked across instantaneously being
∫ Ω±j
Λ±j
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx.
Once decider j has been kicked its probability density is given by ρj(x, t
←
i ). Thus, the total
conditional probability that decider j diffuses through the ± gate is:
(7) P (j diff. across ± gate|i crossing ± gate at time ti)
=
∫ Ω±j
Λ±j
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
∫ θj
−θj
ρj(x, t
←
i )
±
j (x)dx.
Finally, the probability of j crossing the ± gate (by whatever means) conditioned on i
crossing the same gate at ti is from Eqs. (6) and (7):
(8) P (Gj = ±1|i crossing ± gate at time ti)
=
∫ U±j
L±j
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx+
∫ Ω±j
Λ±j
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
∫ θj
−θj
ρj(x, t
←
i )
±
j (x)dx.
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Putting this all together, we find that the probability that both deciders cross the ± gate
(with i crossing before j) is given by:
(9) P (Gi = Gj = ±1|ti < tj)
=
∫ ∞
0
f±i (ti|ti < tj)
[∫ U±j
L±j
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
+
∫ Ω±ij
Λ±j
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
∫ θj
−θj
ρj(x, t
←
i )
±
j (x)dx
]
dti.
Without loss of generality we now calculate the probability that both decide on the +
choice. In this case, we have that Eq. (9) is:
P (Gi = Gj = 1|ti < tj)
=
∫ ∞
0
f+i (ti|ti < tj)
[∫ θj
θj−q
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
+
∫ −θj+q
−θj
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
∫ θj
−θj
ρj(x, t
←
i )
+
j (x)dx
]
dti.
Finally, the probability of a +,+ group decision is then given by the sums of the proba-
bilities for the cases that t1 < t2 and t2 < t1. This yields:
(10) P++ ≡ Prob(G1 = 1, G2 = 1)
=
2∑
i=1
j 6=i
∫ ∞
0
f+i (ti|ti < tj)
[∫ θj
θj−q
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
+
∫ −θj+q
−θj
ρj(x, t
→
i )dx
∫ θj
−θj
ρj(x, t
←
i )
+
j (x)dx
]
dti.
Eq. (10) naturally decomposes into two terms. The first term represents the contribution
whereby decider j is kicked across the threshold instantly from the kick that it receives from
decider i. The second term is the contribution when j is kicked by i, and then j diffuses, at
a later time, across the threshold.
2.3. Simulation and theory results. To explore the joint decision dynamics of Eqs. (1)-
(2) we begin by setting D = 1, µ1 = −µ2 = 0.75, θ2 = 1, and varying over θ1 and q. More to
the point, we assume that the deciders have opposing drifts so that if D = 0 and q = 0 then
P++ = 0. However, with D > 0 and q > 0 noise induced errors and decider interaction will
ensure that P++ > 0.
For various values of q we consider the contributions to P++ that result from an instan-
taneous kick (Figure 3A) and a kick with diffusion (Figure 3B), as well as their sum (Figure
3C). When q = 0.45 the instantaneous component is much smaller than the kick and diffuse
7
0.54
0.47
0.40
0.33
0.24
0.19
0.14
0.03
0.02
0.02
0
0.28
0.25
0.22
0.19
0.08
0.04
0
0.61
0.37
0.49
0.25
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.00.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
θ1θ1
P +
+
P +
+
P +
+
Instantaneous component 
Diffusion component 
theory
simulations
A
B
C
Figure 3: Instantaneous (A) and diffusion (B) components of P++ for a two-decider system
as θ1 varies. Here D = 1, µ1 = 0.75, µ2 = −0.75, and θ2 = 1. C. The solid lines are calculated
directly from Eq. (10), while the dashed lines are calculated using simulations of Eqs. (1)-(2)
with a stochastic Euler scheme (∆t = 10−3, 105 decisions for a fixed θ). In all panels we show
results for the different interaction strengths (q) as indicated in the legend.
component (Figure 3A,B, blue curves). This is expected since the coupling is weak relative
to the typical distance between Xi and ±θi. In contrast, when q = 1.85 the instantaneous
component far outweighs the kick and diffuse component (Figure 3A,B, red curves). The total
probability P++ (sum of the two components) as derived from our analysis in Eq. (10) gives a
very accurate match to direct simulations of the decision processes described by the Langevin
equations in Eqs. (1)-(2) (Figure 3C, dashed vs. solid curves).
The central aim of our study is to understand how θ1 determines P++. For q = 0 this is
straightforward. In this case the deciders are independent with P (G1 = 1, G2 = 1) = P (G1 =
1)P (G2 = 1), and maximizing P++ is equivalent to maximizing P (G1 = 1). When µ1 > 0
then P (G1 = 1) only increases with θ1, since large decision thresholds are less susceptible to
noise induced decision errors. Thus, for groups without coupling decider 1 should have as
high a decision threshold as possible, to at least be confident in their own decision. Decision
networks with q > 0 give an interesting contrast to the independent case.
For both small and large q, P++ is maximized at a finite value of θ1 < θ2 = 1 (Figure 3C,
blue and red curves). In other words, if a decider wishes to bias the group decision towards
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Figure 4: Values of P++ and θ at the interior maximum as a function of the coupling q. The
dashed line in the P++ plot is the limiting value of the maximum P++ when q = 0.
their personal bias then they should set their decision threshold to a lower value than if they
were deciding in isolation from the group. While large θ1 mitigates the fluctuations in the
decision process, it also forces the decision time t1 to be large. Recall that if t1 > t2 then
decider 1 cannot influence decider 2, since decider 2 will have already decided. Thus, in
coupled networks there is a benefit to deciding early so as to influence the neighbor decider.
In this way the coupling introduces a form of ’speed accuracy tradeoff’ in the group decision.
The interior maximum in P++ as a function of θ1, labeled θmax, first appears at q ≈ 0.45
(Figure 4). As q increases the value of θmax decreases initially. This is because for larger q
the + decider has more influence on the − decider, and to maximize P++ through interaction
it is best to have a lower value of θ1 so that there is a higher probability that t1 < t2. In
a small region around q = 1, the peak disappears, and then reappears for larger q. After it
reappears, θmax increases with q. This is because for large q when the + decider makes its
choice, it will likely immediately kick the other decider, forcing it to make the same choice.
Thus, for q > 1 it is best for it to have a higher threshold, thereby increasing the chance that
decider 1 will cross the + threshold, which will likely result in the other decider making the
9
+ choice as well through an instaneous kick. At the limit q = 2, the curves become saturated
because when one of the deciders makes its decision, it will always kick the other one over the
same threshold (since q is twice the value of θ2).
In general, the value of P++ at θmax increases with q, since coupling will increase the
probability of both making the same decision. We remark that for large q the group decision
P++ at θmax is larger than the case for q = 0 and θ →∞ (Figure 4B, dashed vs. solid). In other
words, despite the + decider losing accuracy with a lower decision threshold, with sufficient
coupling the probability of the +,+ group decision is higher than the optimal uncoupled case.
Finally, we asked whether the interior maximum in P++ as a function of θ1 is a robust
feature over a range in µ2 and D. Overall, P++ increases with D since fluctuations are required
for decider 2 (with µ2 = −0.75) to cross the positive θ2 threshold. For a wide range of D
a maximum occurs at a specific θ1 < θ2 = 1 (Figure 5A). The maximum is also robust to
changes in µ2 < 0; however, the maximum disappears when µ2 becomes sufficiently positive
(Figure 5B). In this case decider 2 will have a tendency to cross the positive threshold even
without coupling. However, for θ1 < θ2 there is a larger gain in P++ than for θ1 > θ2. This
is because for θ1 < θ2 the interaction can help overcome the fluctuations that causes errors in
decider 2. The robustness of a maximum in P++ at a finite value of θ1 occurs for large q as
well (not shown).
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Figure 5: Joint probability of a +,+ group decision for various values of the diffusion coefficient
D (A) and the bias for decider 2 µ2 (B). Here µ1 = 0.75 and q = 0.45.
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Figure 6: A. A schematic of the population. Members of B can influence other B members
and A members, but A members can influence no one. B. A demonstration of the cascading
effect discussed in the text. Populations A (2 members) and B (3 members) are as described
in the text, with Q = 0.5. Here, B1 escapes first, kicking all the other members down. This
almost immediately pushes out B3 through the lower exit, further lowering A1, A2, and B2.
C. Fraction fd of deciders that make the - choice.
3. Decision dynamics in larger groups. Our analytic theory can be extended to the N -
decider case (see Appendix). However, for N > 2, the theory is cumbersome and we will
simply explore the larger population case using numerical simulations. We consider a total
population of 100 deciders. We divide them into two populations, A with NA = 75 deciders,
and B with NB = 25 deciders. The diffusion coefficient for all the deciders in the population
is fixed at D = 1. As in the two decider case the drift for deciders in group A is µ = 0.75,
while the drift for deciders in B is −µ. Members of population A have no influence on any
member, so that qAA = qAB = 0, while members of B influence everyone in the system with
magnitude q, so that qBA = qBB = q (Figure 6A). The Langevin equations governing the
evidence accumulation for this system are as follows.
dXAi = µdt+
√
2DdWAi +
NB∑
k=1
GBkqδ(t− tk),(11)
dXBj = −µdt+
√
2DdWBj +
NB∑
k=1
GBkqδ(t− tk)(1− δjk),(12)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 75, 1 ≤ j ≤ 25, tk is the time at which decider k in the B population decides,
GBk is ±1 if decider k chose the ± decision. The 1−δik term in Eq. (12) removes self coupling
within population B. Sample realizations show stochastic decision dynamics similar to the
two decider case (Figure 6B).
Let fd be the fraction of deciders that choose the − decision. For q > 0 this measures
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the influence that the smaller, interacting part of the population has on the group as a whole;
i.e. the more deciders that choose the − decision, the more influence population B has on the
total population. In the limit q → 0, to maximize fd we should send θB → ∞ to maximize
the chance that B deciders cross through the negative threshold. However, as q increases fd
is maximized at a finite value of θB (Figure 6C; θA = 1). This maximum can be as high
as fd ≈ 0.8 – a quarter of the population has made 80 percent of the total members of the
population cross through the − threshold towards which the the 25 members of population B
are biased (Figure 6C, q = 0.1).
Note that, unlike in the two-decider case discussed above, the value of the peak first
increases with q, but then it decreases and eventually saturates (Figure 6C, q = 0.5 and q = 2
curves). This can be explained as follows. When the first B decider makes its decision, it will
make the ± choice and will shift the evidences of all of the other deciders in the ± direction.
If q is large, this will cause a large number of deciders (some of which will, of course, be B
deciders) to cross through the ± threshold. These will in turn shift the remaining deciders,
causing some of them to cross, and so on and so forth. In this way, for large enough values
of q, we have a cascading effect–the fate of almost all the deciders is determined by a single
(uncertain) decider. This dynamic is akin to herd behavior where members of the group are
driven primarily by neighbor decisions rather than their own evidence accumulation [1].
On the other hand, for smaller values of q one decider will have some influence on the
system, but not enough to solely influence a large fraction of the population. Rather, the
system’s overall behavior is dependent on more than one decider and is thus subject to less
noise. This means that a higher fraction of the deciders will decide on the choice towards
which B is biased.
Our simulations of the N -decider system show that larger populations qualitatively match
the key feature of the 2-decider case. Namely, for nonzero coupling it is possible to choose a
decision threshold so as to maximize the probability of a coordinated group decision.
4. Discussion. In this paper we modeled interactions between two or more TAFC drift-
diffusion models. In the two-decider model the deciders were biased towards opposite decisions.
By varying the threshold for the + decider, we determined how P++ (the probability that both
deciders choose the + gate) is controlled for various values of the coupling strength q. When
q = 0, i.e., no coupling, P++ is maximized for decision threshold θ → ∞. Our main finding
is that for a large range of q > 0, P++ is maximized at a finite θ for the + decider. The
intuition for the two decider case was extended to a large population of coupled deciders,
where we demonstrated that with an appropriately chosen threshold a small but strongly
coupled subgroup of the population can have a large impact on the group decision.
In developing the theory of the two-decider system, we had to consider integrals over one
of the time variables (see Eq. (5)). In principle, this can be extended to the case with N
deciders. However, in order to complete this, we need to analyze the combinatorics of the
orders in which the deciders make their decisions (see Appendix). The analog of (5) for the
N -decider case will be an N − 1 dimensional integral (see Eq. (13)). Evaluating a large
number of these high-dimensional integrals is computationally cumbersome.
Previous studies have considered the collective decision making of groups of drift-diffusion
models. One class of model considers the accumulation dynamics in populations of uncoupled
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agents with a threshold decision rule (same as Eqs. (1)-(2) with q = 0) combined with a consen-
sus group decision [9, 14]. In such models the independent diffusion permits a clear analysis to
be performed. Another class of model considers evidence accumulation in a population where
deciders linearly couple their evidence [23, 15]. Here the interaction is continuous in time, yet
the decision mechanics do not involve thresholded evidence, rather the accumulation is free
running. The linearity of the model permits an analysis of the full population accumulation.
Our framework is distinct from these models in that it combines both interaction during the
accumulation process and a threshold decision rule. Evidence accumulation is only shared at
decision times, and otherwise accumulation is independent between deciders, permitting an
analysis of group activity (Eq. (10)). However, both the uncoupled population model with
consensus and the linear free running population model have analysis that scales well with
system size, unlike our model.
Our model exhibits a form of speed-accuracy tradeoff [28, 5, 6, 4, 23]. In the TAFC task
there is a tradeoff in the decision making process: the decider would like to make the correct
decision in the shortest amount of time. To increase the probability that it makes the correct
choice the decider can increase the amount of evidence that it requires to make a decision (i.e.,
the threshold θ). However, larger decision thresholds increase the amount of time it takes to
reach the threshold, and hence decision accuracy and decision speed are at odds with one
another.
In the classical speed-accuracy tradeoff for a single TAFC drift-diffusion model, the reward
for making a correct decision quickly is expressed via a ‘cost function’ that is added to the
model by hand [4]. However, in our group decision model the speed-accuracy tradeoff emerges
from the group interaction. The decision agents still want to be accurate, but the incentive
for speed is not a built-in cost function. Rather, the reward for an individual decider to
make its choice quickly (and correctly) is the chance for it to have influence other members of
the population, and thus increase the fraction of population members that decide its correct
choice.
The single decider drift diffusion model has been a very influential in decision theory
[25, 16, 24, 4, 17], in large part because one can compute the threshold value θ that will
optimize the reward rate received by the decider [4]. Combining this theory and efficient
statistical techniques to estimate the drift and diffusion terms from a collection of decision
experiments gives a prescription to test whether deciders are acting optimally. Our model
provides a theory for the decision outcome and times from groups of coupled deciders. It
remains to extend our theory in Eq. (10) to compute optimal thresholds (θ) and interactions
(q) under a set of task constraints. With this in hand it may be possible to determine whether
groups of deciders act optimally.
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Appendix A. Theory for N-Decider case. Suppose we have N deciders where decider
i has evidence accumulation described by Di, µi, and θi. A decider pair has a coupling qij
representing the influence of j on i. If decider i escapes through the threshold ±θi, we assign
the value ±1 to Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ N). We wish to calculate:
P (G1, . . . , GN , ord) ,
where ord refers to the decision order under consideration; without loss of generality we take
ord = t1 < t2 < · · · < tN . This probability can be written as follows
P (G1, . . . , GN , ord) =
∫ ∞
0
dt1P (G1, t1, ord)P (G2, . . . , GN |G1, t1, ord) .
We have that:
(13) P (G1, t1, ord) =
∫
ord
fG11 (t1)
N∏
k=2
fk (tk) dt2 · · · dtN .
Define fG11,ord (t1) ≡
∫
ord f
G1
1 (t1)
N∏
k=2
fk (tk) dt2 · · · dtN so that
P (G1, . . . , GN , ord) =
∫ ∞
0
dt1f
G1
1,ord (t1)P (G2, . . . , GN |G1, t1, ord) .
We now wish to calculate P (G2, . . . , GN |G1, t1, ord). Note that decider 2 makes its deci-
sion after decider 1 but before decider 3, and so on. At each stage there are two possibilities:
either the decider is kicked instantly across the desired threshold (which is only possible if
Gi = Gi−1), or it diffuses and escapes later. Now, define the probability density (tj is the
time at which decider j makes its decision) as:
ρi (xi, t;G1qi1, t1, . . . , Gkqik, tk)
to be the density of decider i’s evidence at time t after the kicks G1qi1 at t1, . . . , Gkqik, at
time tk. Define ρi (xj , t; k) ≡ ρi (xi, t;G1qi1, t1, . . . , Gkqik, tk) .
If decider 1 escapes at t1, decider 2 can escape instantly so that t2 = t1, or it can escape
at some later time t2 > t1. In either of these situations, it can kick 3 across instantly, or some
time later, and so on, until the Nth decider. This can be seen below schematically.
decider 1 crosses at t1 −→
{ 2 kicked inst. −→ { 3 kicked inst. −→ · · ·
3 crosses later −→ · · ·
2 crosses later −→
{
3 kicked inst. −→ · · ·
3 crosses later −→ · · ·
For each 2 ≤ i ≤ N define the variable ki to be
ki =
{
0, i kicked instantly after i− 1
1, i escapes sometime later through correct gate
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Now, consider the decision of the ith decider. Suppose that the previous deciders made
their decisions at times t1, . . . , tk. If ki = 0, the probability that decider makes an instantaneous
threshold crossing is: ∫ ui−1i
`i−1i
ρi (xi, ti−1; i− 2) dx
where
`i−1i = `
i−1
i (Gi, Gi−1) =
{
θi −Gi−1qi−1i , Gi > 0
−θi, Gi < 0
ui−1i = u
i−1
i (Gi, Gi−1) =
{
θi, Gi > 0
−θi −Gi−1qi−1i , Gi < 0.
.
The probability that the decision is not made instantly is:∫ U i−1i
Li−1i
ρi (xi, ti−1; i− 2) dx
with
Li−1i = L
i−1
i (Gi, Gi−1) =
{
−θ, Gi−1 > 0
−θi + qi−1i , Gi−1 < 0
U i−1i = U
i−1
i (Gi, Gi−1) =
{
θi − qi−1i , Gi−1 > 0
θi, Gi−1 < 0
.
Given that decider i does not decide instantly after i − 1, the first passage time density
fGii (ti; i− 1) is obtained by calculating the flux from ρi (xi, ti; i− 1) , normalized such that∫ ∞
ti−1
[
fGii (ti; i− 1) + f−Gii (ti; i− 1)
]
dti = 1.
Thus the contribution from this case is:∫ U i−1i
Li−1i
ρi (xi, ti−1; i− 2) dx
∫ ∞
ti−1
fGii (ti; i− 1) dti.
Note that everything after decider i depends on ti so we are integrating these over ti as well.
Now, at each stage (i.e. for each value of i > 1), ki can be 0 or 1. Summing over all possible
values of the ki’s gives us all cases for a given set of decisions (G’s) and a time ordering:
P (G1, . . . , GN , ord) =
∫ ∞
0
fG11,ord (t1)P (G2, . . . , GN |G1, t1, ord) dt1
=
∑
k2,...,kn
∫ ∞
0
fG11,ord (t1)P (G2, . . . , GN , k2, . . . , kn|G1, t1, ord) dt1
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For a given set of values for k2, . . . , ki−1, the contribution from decider i is
Ci (ki; k2, . . . , ki−1) =
{ ∫ ui−1i
`i−1i
ρi (xi, ti−1; i− 2) dx, ki = 0∫ U i−1i
Li−1i
ρi (xi, ti−1; i− 2) dx
∫∞
ti−1 f
Gi
i (ti; i− 1) dti, ki = 1.
As well,
P (G2, . . . , GN , k2, . . . , kn|G1, t1, ord) =
N∏
i=2
Ci (ki; k2, . . . , ki−1)
so that
P (G2, . . . , GN , ord) =
∑
k2,...,kn
∫ ∞
0
fG11,ord (t1) dt1
N∏
i=2
Ci (ki; k2, . . . , ki−1) .
We can define C1 ≡
∫∞
0 dt1f
G1
1,ord (t1) so that
P (G2, . . . , GN , ord) =
∑
k2,...,kn
N∏
i=1
Ci (ki; k2, . . . , ki−1) .
As an application consider a system with three deciders; two are in the A population,
and one is in the B population. Let Da = Db = D, and µB = −µA = −µ. The deciders in
the A population (A1 and A2) influence the other system members with magnitude qA and
the B decider influences the other deciders with magnitude qB. Up to permutations of the A
deciders, there are 3 ways of ordering the deciders:
ord 1: ta1 < ta2 < tb
ord 2: ta1 < tb < ta2
ord 3: tb < ta1 < ta2.
Let us calculate P (G1, G2, G3, ord 1) (labeling the deciders as 1 ←→ A1, 2 ←→ A2, and
3←→ B). Using the scheme outlined above,
A1 crosses at tA1 −→
{ k2 = 0 −→ { k3 = 0k3 = 1
k2 = 1 −→
{
k3 = 0
k3 = 1
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So, using the formulas for each case,
P (G1, G2, G3, ord 1)
=
∫ ∞
0
fG1A,ord1 (t1) dt1

δG1G2
∫ u12
`12
ρA (x, t1) dx δG2G3 ∫ u23`23 ρB (x, t1; 1) dx
+
∫ U23
L23
ρB (x, t1; t1) dx
∫ θB
−θB ρB (x, t1; t1, t1) ε
G3
B (x) dx

+
∫ U12
L12
ρA (x, t1) dx
∫∞
t1
dt2f
G2
a (t2; 1) δG2G3 ∫ u23`23 ρB (x, t2; 1) dx
+
∫ U23
L23
ρB (x, t2; t1) dx
∫ θB
−θB ρB (x, t2; t1, t2) ε
G3
B (x) dx


To get ord 2 from ord 1, we need to swap decider 2 with decider 3.
P (G1, G2, G3, ord 2)
=
∫ ∞
0
fG1A,ord2 (t1) dt1

δG1G3
∫ u13
`13
ρB (x, t1) dx
 δG2G3 ∫ u32`32 ρA (x, t1; 1) dx
+
∫ U32
L32
ρa (x, t1; t1) dx
∫ θA
−θa ρA (x, t1; t1, t1) ε
G2
A (x) dx

+
∫ U13
L13
ρB (x, t1) dx
∫∞
t1
fG3B (t3; 1) dt3 δG2G3 ∫ u32`32 ρA (x, t3; 1) dx
+
∫ U32
L32
ρa (x, t3; t1) dx
∫ θA
−θA ρA (x, t3; t1, t3) ε
G2
A (x) dx


To get ord 3 from ord 2, we switch decider 1 with decider 3.
P (G1, G2, G3, ord 3)
=
∫ ∞
0
fG3B,ord3 (t3) dt3

δG1G3
∫ u31
`31
ρA (x, t3) dx
 δG2G1 ∫ u12`12 ρA (x, t3; 1) dx
+
∫ U12
L12
ρA (x, t3; t3) dx
∫ θA
−θA ρA (x, t3; t3, t3) ε
G2
A (x) dx

+
∫ U31
L31
ρA (x, t3) dx
∫∞
t3
fG1A (t1; 1) dt1 δG2G1 ∫ u12`12 ρA (x, t3; 1) dx
+
∫ U12
L12
ρA (x, t3; t1) dx
∫ θA
−θa ρA (x, t3; t3, t1) ε
G2
A (x) dx


Here ρA (x, t; 1) represents the density of A after the first kick, and ρB (x, t; t1, t3) is the density
of B after the first kick at t1 and the second kick at t3, and ε
±1
i (x) is the probability that a
decider of type i (= A or B) at some evidence x will cross threshold ±θi. Now, for each of the
ord 1, ord 2, ord 3, we can swap the two A deciders and get the same answer; these represent
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all possible time orderings. Hence,
P (G1, G2, G3)
= 2
3∑
i=1
P (G1, G2, G3, ord i)
= 2
∫ ∞
0
fG1A,ord1 (t1) dt1

δG1G2
∫ u12
`12
ρA (x, t1) dx
 δG2G3 ∫ u23`23 ρB (x, t1; 1) dx
+
∫ U23
L23
ρB (x, t1; t1) dx
∫ θB
−θB ρB (x, t1; t1, t1) ε
G3
B (x) dx

+
∫ U12
L12
ρA (x, t1) dx
∫∞
t1
dt2f
G2
A (t2; 1) δG2G3 ∫ u23`23 ρB (x, t2; 1) dx
+
∫ U23
L23
ρB (x, t2; t1) dx
∫ θB
−θB ρB (x, t2; t1, t2) ε
G3
B (x) dx


+ 2
∫ ∞
0
dt1f
G2
A,ord2 (t1)

δG1G3
∫ u13
`13
ρB (x, t1) dx
 δG2G3 ∫ u32`32 ρA (x, t1; 1) dx
+
∫ U32
L32
ρA (x, t1; t1) dx
∫ θA
−θA ρA (x, t1; t1, t1) ε
G2
A (x) dx

+
∫ U13
L13
ρB (x, t1) dx
∫∞
t1
dt3f
G3
B (t3; 1) δG2G3 ∫ u32`32 ρA (x, t3; 1) dx
+
∫ U32
L32
ρA (x, t3; t1) dx
∫ θA
−θA ρA (x, t3; t1, t3) ε
G2
A (x) dx


+ 2
∫ ∞
0
dt3f
G3
B,ord3 (t3)

δG1G3
∫ u31
`31
ρA (x, t3) dx
 δG2G1 ∫ u12`12 ρA (x, t3; 1) dx
+
∫ U12
L12
ρA (x, t3; t3) dx
∫ θA
−θA ρA (x, t3; t3, t3) ε
G2
A (x) dx

+
∫ U31
L31
ρA (x, t3) dx
∫∞
t3
dt1f
G1
A (t1; 1) δG2G1 ∫ u12`12 ρA (x, t3; 1) dx
+
∫ U12
L12
ρA (x, t3; t1) dx
∫ θA
−θA ρA (x, t3; t3, t1) ε
G2
A (x) dx


We want to calculate the probability that 2 or more deciders make the - choice. There are
four quantities to calculate:
P (−,−,−) , P (−,−,+) , P (−,+,−) , P (+,−,−) .
However, note that the last two are the same, due to the symmetry of the a deciders.
Hence,
Pmajority − = P (−,−,−) + P (−,−,+) + 2P (−,+,−) .
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